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Measuring Bank Contagion in Europe Using Binary
Spatial Regression Models
Abstract
The recent European sovereign debt crisis clearly illustrates the importance of mea-
suring the contagion effects of bank failures. Indeed, to better understand and monitor
contagion risk, the European Central Bank is assuming the supervision of the largest banks
in each of the member states. We propose a measure of contagion risk based on the spatial
autocorrelation parameter of a binary spatial autoregressive model. Using different spec-
ifications of the interbank connectivity matrix, we estimate the contagion parameter for
banks within the Eurozone, between 1996 and 2012. We provide evidence of high levels
of systemic risk due to contagion during the European sovereign debt crisis.
Keywords: Contagion risk, spatial autoregressive models, European banks, binary data.
1 Introduction
The recent banking crises in the United States and Europe have generated frequent comments
about the contagion effects of banks in distress—referred to as systemic risk. The collapse of
one major US bank, Lehmann Brothers, triggered a cascade of crises among financial institu-
tions in the US and abroad. Similar fears related to the potential collapse of banks that are “too
big to fail” has lead to renewed attention to the containment of risk among banks in the Basel
Committee deliberations; within Europe in particular by the European Banking Authority and
the European Central Bank.
The definition of systemic risk involves a collection of interconnected institutions that have
mutually beneficial business relationships through which insolvency can quickly propagate dur-
ing periods of financial distress (Billio et al., 2012). Sytemic risk can be decomposed into an
idiosyncratic and a systematic (or contagion) component. The first part affects only the health
of a single financial institution, while the latter affects the banking system as a whole at the
same time.
During the latest financial crisis, Eurozone banks have been suffering considerably, espe-
cially in southern countries. In recent years provisions and write-offs of loan credits have
increased dramatically and an increasing number of banks required capital injections. These
are not easy to obtain, as country solvency risk and financial frictions in Europe has increased
cost and availability of funding. However, especially after the European Banking Union Reso-
lution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) has come into force, on January 1st, 2016, it makes a
lot of sense to study the characteristics of the Eurozone banking system as a whole, with the
aim of understanding which are the most likely factors of default of the banks, whether they
are country specific or, rather, idiosyncratic and whether there is a feedback contagion effect.
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The main aim of this paper is to propose a method that central banks can use for three main
purposes:
• predicting the probability of financial distress for a bank;
• measuring the contagion risk of a banking system;
• performing a stress test analysis.
We propose to use a binary spatial autoregressive model (Fleming, 2004; Calabrese and
Elkink, 2014) to achieve these aims. The dependent variable in this context is banking default,
since the defaulting of a bank implies that other banks which have direct financial relations
with the bank in crisis are losing their assets. We build a dependent variable based on banks
which end up in bankruptcy, which are dissolved, or which are liquidated. We apply Klier and
McMillen (2008)’s estimators on 4,661 European banks from 1999 to 2012. To obtain an early
warning model, the independent variables, given by banks’ balance sheet data and macroeco-
nomic variables, are evaluated one year in advance with respect to the time in which the bank
distress (response variable) is evaluated. We propose to use the autocorrelation parameter of
the spatial model as a measure of contagion risk. Once the model is estimated on the data, it
can be used to forecast the probability that a specific bank will be in financial distress in the
future. Furthermore, choosing appropriate macroeconomic variables, a central bank can use
the model to perform a stress testing analysis on the banking system.
The main advantage of our proposal is that a central bank can achieve three important
aims, such as predicting banks’ default, measuring contagion risk and performing a stress test
analysis, using only one model. Central banks usually use two or three models to complete
these objectives. The most used model to gain the first and the third purposes is a logistic
regression model Calabrese and Giudici (2014) that ignores the interconnectedness between
the financial institutions. On the contrary, our approach can represent both the idiosyncratic
effect, given by banks’ balance sheet characteristics, and the contagion component, given by
the autocorrelation parameter. The widely used framework for modelling contagion risk is
network analysis Allen and Babus (2008), which cannot include the idiosyncratic effect of
systemic risk and cannot be used for stress testing from a central bank.
After describing the literature review in the next section, Section 3 discusses the binary
spatial regression model applied in this analysis. Section 4 describes our approximation of the
interbank credit network of banks, while Section 5 provides the regression results. A brief
discussion with suggestions for future research follows.
2 Literature review
Research studies on bank failures can be classified into two main streams: the analyses princi-
pally focused on financial market data or those on balance sheet data.
Financial market models originate from the seminal paper of Merton (1974), in which the
market value of a bank’s assets, typically modeled as a diffusion process, is insufficient to
meet its liabilities. Because of its practical limitations, Merton’s model has been developed
into reduced form by Vasicek (1984), leading to widespread diffusion of the resulting model,
and the related implementation in Basel II credit portfolio models. In order to implement
market models, diffusion process parameters and, therefore, bank default probabilities, this
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model only requires share price data that can be collected almost in real time from financial
markets. Market data are relatively easy to collect and publicly available.
The second stream of studies on bank failures is based on financial book values, taken
from publicly available balance sheets. Its diffusion has followed the seminal paper by Alt-
man (1968) and further developments are given by the noticeable studies in Sinkey (1975),
Tam and Kiang (1992) and Cole and Gunther (1998). The development of the Basel regula-
tion1 and the recent financial crisis have further boosted the literature on models based on bal-
ance sheet data for banking failure predictions. Recent examples include Arena (2008), Davis
and Karim (2008a) and Klomp and Haan (2012). This stream has been extended in different
ways: interesting developments include the incorporation of macroeconomic components (see,
e.g., Calabrese and Giudici, 2014; Koopman, Lucas and Schwaab, 2012; Kanno, 2012; Kenny,
Kostka and Masera, 2013) and the explicit consideration of the credit portfolio, as in the Sym-
bol Model of De Lisa et al. (2011), that allows stress tests of banking asset quality and capital,
as emphasized in the recent paper by Halaj (2013).
The previous models focused on the prediction of bank failures usually ignore financial
contagion, i.e. financial intitutions are connected through bilateral exposures, so the failure
of one financial institution can cause difficulties at the financial institutions with claims on
it. These difficulties can propagate through the banking system through chains of interbank
flows. One of the aims of this paper is to extend scoring models, taking interconnectedness
into account by means of a spatial modelling approach. Analogously to the literature on bank
failures, also the empirical studies on financial contagion can be initially classified into two
main streams, one using financial market data (see, e.g., Billio et al., 2012; Gropp, Lo Duca
and Vesala, 2009) and one using banks’ balance sheet data (see, e.g., Boss et al., 2004; Mistrulli,
2011; Upper and Worms, 2004).
The most used approach to model connections among financial institutions is network anal-
ysis (see Allen and Babus (2008) for a review). Several studies show that a high network con-
nectivity is both positive and negative for financial stability. For a high level of connectivity,
there are risk sharing opportunities in the event of small shocks. However, over a given thresh-
old of the connectivity level, the network enables shock propagation (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and
Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015; Elliot, Golub and Jackson, 2014), thus exacerbating crisis. Minoiu et al.
(2013) show that if the financial interconnectedness in a country increases and its neighbours’
connectedness decreases, the probability of banking crisis is higher.
In this paper, we suggest to use spatial econometrics instead of network analysis to study
the interconnectedness of the banking sector. Spatial econometrics (LeSage and Pace, 2009)
incorporates dependence among observations that are in any kind of proximity, not only ge-
ographical. The main advantages of the spatial econometrics approach over the traditional
network analysis is that central banks can use it both as an early warning model, to forecast the
failure of a given bank, and as a stress testing technique, the importance of which is growing,
as demonstrated by the analyses of the European Banking Authority in recent years. Therefore,
relatively to network-based models, spatial econometrics is not only a descriptive technique,
but also predictive. As the network is assumed given and exogenous in our proposal, we cannot
use spatial econometrics to identify the characteristics of the network that might improve the
financial stability of the banking sector, as Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) and
Gai, Haldane and Kapadia (2011) show in their studies. Neither the causes of interconnected-
1See http://www.bis.org.
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ness, that represents the main focus of Allen and Babus (2008)’s analysis, nor the mechanism
of propagation, which is the objective of Elliot, Golub and Jackson (2014)’s study, can be in-
vestigated using the spatial econometrics approach. On the contrary, these important aspects of
financial contagion can be deeply examined using network analysis.
3 Spatial logit
The model used in this paper is that of a binary spatial autoregressive structure, whereby the
dependent variable is binary and a spatial autoregressive structure is assumed in the underlying
latent variable or utility function. Taking the latent underlying quantity to be represented by a
continuous variable Y ∗i , we consider the observation mechanism as
Yi =
{
1, Y ∗i > 0
0, otherwise, (1)
with i = 1,2, . . . ,n. We implement the spatial structure with an autoregressive model specifica-
tion, such that
Y∗ = ρWY∗+Xβ+, (2)
where Y∗ is a continuous random vector, X represents an n×k matrix of explanatory variables,
the error term  follows a multivariate logistic distribution and W is the spatial lag weight
matrix with ρ the associated latent parameter. Note that only the latent variable can be used
for the spatial lag, since both the models Y∗ = ρWY+Xβ+  and Y = ρWY+Xβ+  are
infeasible (Anselin, 2002; Beron and Vijverberg, 2004; Klier and McMillen, 2008).
This model implies heteroskedastic errors e as follows:
Y∗ = (I−ρW)−1(Xβ+) = (I−ρW)−1Xβ+ e, (3)
where
e= (I−ρW)−1. (4)
Calabrese and Elkink (2014) demonstrate through Monte Carlo simulations that among the
estimators for binary spatial autoregressive models, the by far least computationally intensive
estimator, proposed by Klier and McMillen (2008), is suitable when the data set is sufficiently
large and the intensity of the spatial coefficient sufficiently low. This is precisely the type of
data we have here, where we study a large number of banks and the collapse of one bank is
likely to have some impact on the probability of default of other banks, but not so dramatically
as to undermine the banking sector. We therefore apply this estimator to our data.
Following the notation in Calabrese and Elkink (2014), the variance of the error term is
var(e) = var
[
(I−ρW)−1]= σ2 [(I−ρW)′(I−ρW)]−1 . (5)
Let
D= diag(σe) (6)
be the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements σe that represent the root square of the diagonal
elements in the matrix (5) and
q= D−1(I−ρW)−1Xβ. (7)
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Pinkse and Slade (1998) derive Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) moment equa-
tions from the likelihood function of a spatial error probit model, for which Klier and McMillen
(2008) propose a linearized version based on a logistic distribution with a computationally ef-
ficient approximation to estimate the model parameters. Pinkse and Slade (1998) consider the
generalized residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968; Chesher and Irish, 1987)
e˜(θ) = D−1E[e/y,θ] =
φn [q(θ)]{y−Φn[q(θ)]}
Φn [q(θ)]{1−Φn[q(θ)]} , (8)
where θ = (β′,ρ)′ is the parameter vector and D and q are defined in equations (6) and (7),
respectively. The parameter vector θ is then estimated by
θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
e˜′(θ)ZMZ′e˜(θ), (9)
where e˜ is defined in equation (8), Z is a matrix of instruments, M is a positive definite matrix
and Θ is the parametric space. In equation (9), Klier and McMillen (2008) let M = (Z′Z)−1,
such that they can propose a nonlinear two-stage least squares method. We define
P= P{Y= 1/θ}= exp[q(θ)]
1+ exp[q(θ)]
, (10)
where q(θ) is defined in equation (7). Taking initial values θ0 = (β′0,ρ0)
′ and computing e0
following equation (4), the gradient terms are computed as
Gβi =
∂Pi
∂β
= Pˆi(1− Pˆi)ti
Gρi =
∂Pi
∂ρ
= Pˆi(1− Pˆi)
[
hi− qiσ2ei
Υii
]
, (11)
where ti is the i-th row vector of the matrix T=D−1(I−ρW)−1X, hi is the i-th element of the
vector h= (I−ρW)−1Wq, qi is the i-th element of the vector q defined in equation (7) and ϒii
is the i-th element of the diagonal of the matrix Υ = (I−ρW)−1W(I−ρW)−1(I−ρW)−1.
At the convenient starting point of ρ = 0, it is straightforward to compute the gradients. These
gradient terms Gβ and Gρ are subsequently regressed on Z and predicted values Gˆβ and Gˆρ
computed. The coefficient estimates of β and ρ are then based on regressing e0+Gββˆ0 on Gˆβ
and Gˆρ .
We note that the target of our research are central banks and supervisors. For this reason it
is important to derive confidence bands for the ρ parameter.
4 A network of banks
The spatial regression model that we propose is based on an exogenously defined network,
where the nodes reflect the individual banks and the ties some value attached to the connection
between each pair of banks. The ideal information for this matrix would be information about
the claims of any particular bank to any other specific bank, which we denote below as `i j, the
liability of bank i towards bank j. This information, however, is not publicly available, and
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we provide an approximation of this value on the basis of information on the marginals of the
matrix.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics provides information on the aggre-
gate claims of the entire banking sector in one country to the entire banking sector in another,
for a limited number of countries (the informative countries, I) while for some other countries
(Ic) only the overall exposure is provided, without details on the country to which the banking
sector is exposed. See Giudici and Spelta (N.d.) for a deeper description of BIS statistics. In
this paper we use banking sector data available through the BIS, and the individual balance
sheet data from Bankscope. All balance sheet data are from the last reporting date.
Define with A the country of bank i, B the country of bank j, and FAB the claims from
the banking sector in A to the banking sector in country B, whereby i might be in the same
country as j (i.e. A = B). This provides a country-to-country connection matrix of the amount
of exposures. The connection matrix, which we will denote as W F , will then be defined as
follows:
wFi j = FAB. (12)
Where information is unavailable on the specific pair of countries, such that the total exposure
of a country’s banking sector to sectors abroad is known, but not the detail on the specific
dyads, we may assume that the exposure is proportional to the counterpart’s market share of
the interbank credit market. Doing so, we implicitly assume maximum spread of exposure by
banks, as a risk aversion strategy, similar to Upper (2011).
In addition to the international bank credit flows reported by the BIS, data is available from
the balance sheets of banks on their exposure to the interbank credit market, for example from
the Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope data base. Such database provides, among other things, the
overall liabilities and assets of a bank in the (inter)national credit market, but lacks details on
the specific banks or specific countries, where these credit lines are outstanding. In other words,
these data provide a reasonable insight into the margins of the full interbank credit network,
but not into the individual cells, the specific pairs of banks.
As before, we can assume proportionality of international claims across the banking sec-
tor in a particular country, implying that banks avoid risk due to concentration by maximally
spreading their interbank credit exposure. For example, if a bank has deposits from other banks
that amount to 2% of the total amount of deposits of banks with other banks, we assume that
this bank holds 2% of the interbank deposits of each bank—and analogously for loans. This is
an unrealistic assumption but a reasonable approximation in the absence of more detailed data
on interbank credit exposure. We will denote the resulting connection matrix W B. In addition,
information available from the intercountry F-matrix is juxtaposed such that in the W B matrix
the total flow between countries matches the data available on international bank credits.
In more detail, the following data are available:
FAB Total claims from the banking sector in country A to country B, FAB, for countries in
the set I, for which all bilateral exposures are available.
FA· Total claims from the banking sector in country A to other countries, ∑B 6=A FAB, for
countries in set Ic, for which only total exposures are available.
mci Total claims from bank i to other banks, ∑ j `i j.
mlj Total liabilities of bank j to other banks, ∑i `i j.
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We can calculate flows that do not leave the country as
FAA =∑
i∈A
∑
j
`i j− ∑
B6=A
FAB.
We define the marginal flow of claims from country A:
McA =∑
i∈A
∑
j
`i j,
the marginal flow of liabilities to country A:
MlA =∑
i
∑
j∈A
`i j.
We then estimate `i j using the expected value given the marginals as:
ˆ`i j =
∑ j `i j
McA
· ∑i `i j
MlB
·FAB,
where i ∈ A, j ∈ B.
For countries in Ic we estimate the overall flows using a similar logic:
FˆAB =
(McA−∑C∈I FAC)
FIc
· (M
l
B−∑C∈I FBC)
FIc
·∑
i∈A
∑
j∈B
`i j ∀ A ∈ Ic, A 6= B,
where
FIc = ∑
C∈Ic
∑
D
FCD+ ∑
D∈Ic
∑
C
FCD− ∑
C∈Ic∧D∈Ic
FCD.
Time is taken into account through:
wBi j =
{ ˆ`i j if t j ≤ ti ∧ i 6= j
0 otherwise,
(13)
taking ti to be the year of default of bank i or the last reporting year of bank i in the absence of
a default. This implies a constant network structure over time.
—Table 1 about here—
Table 1 shows basic levels of contagion among banks—banks that have failed tend to have
more neighbours in their connection matrix that also failed than banks that did not.
We thus provide an alternative approach to the estimation of the interbank credit matrix
using a simulation strategy as, for example, in Hałaj and Kok (2013).
5 Data and results
We have decided to concentrate our analysis on the Eurozone banking system for the European
sovereign debt crisis. The number of European banks on which we have sufficiently complete
data in Bankscope is 4,661 from 1999 to 2012. We consider a bank to be in distress when
it is in a legal insolvency status of bankruptcy, or in the stages of dissolution and liquidation.
However, we remark that other wider definitions of bank default do exist. For example, some
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authors (Bongini, Claessens and Ferri, 2001; Gonza´lez-Hermosillo, 1999; Va´zquez and Fed-
erico, 2012) consider as defaulted banks that have been merged or acquired by other banks.
As mergers and acquisitions might have been carried out for strategic aims, rather than for in-
solvency reasons (Arena, 2008), we consider them as non-defaults. Other authors include state
aid and government intervention in their definition of default (see, e.g., Buehler, Samandari and
Mazingo, 2009; Brown and Dinc, 2011). However, state aid and interventions are indeed quite
heterogeneous and strongly depend on the regulatory framework of the country to which they
are applied. As, in our analysis, we consider banks from different countries, we do not include
them in our definition of bank failure.
Table 2 provides an overview of the data set with the number of banks in distress and sample
size by country and by year.
—Table 2 about here—
In the analysis below, we will separately estimate our models for before 2008 and 2008
onwards, so take account of the different dynamics and different economic context subsequent
to the start of the banking crisis. Table 3 gives the frequencies of observed defaults, split by
bank size, as measured by equally spaced classes in terms of the logarithm of total assets.
—Table 3 about here—
Table 3 shows that the percentage of defaults decreases as the bank size increases—an
instance of the well known ”too big to fail” mechanism.
In this analysis we use a combination of balance sheet and macroeconomic variables, in line
with earlier work (Calabrese and Giudici, 2014; Calabrese and Osmetti, 2014). As previously
discussed, financial ratios associated with the CAMELS rating system can be used to measure
bank-level fundamentals related to the asset and liability structure of a bank, assuming that
these ratios capture the market, credit, operational, and liquidity risk faced by banks. Taking
the balance sheet variables most commonly used in the literature (e.g. Krause and Giansante,
2012) and removing those where high multicollinearity or large amounts of missing data cause
significant problems, we propose a model that contains the explanatory variables of leverage,
liquidity, loan provisions, return on assets, the loans to assets ratio and (the logarithm of) total
assets.
In addition, our model mixes microeconomic with macroeconomic explanatory factors. To
this aim, we have included the most important macroeconomic variables: inflation, growth
in GDP per capita, and unemployment rates, analogously to Calabrese and Giudici (2014),
Calabrese and Osmetti (2014), Kanno (2012) and Koopman, Lucas and Schwaab (2012). To
estimate the spatial regression model, we use the method proposed by Klier and McMillen
(2008), explained in Section 3. In a simulation study, Calabrese and Elkink (2014) show that the
resulting estimator provides accurate estimates for the autocorrelation parameter ρ . In order to
obtain a predictive, early warning model (Davis and Karim, 2008b; Squartini, van Lelyveld and
Garlaschelli, 2013), our model attempts to predict bank failure one year in advance. Therefore,
all explanatory variables are evaluated one year in advance, with respect to the time in which
the bank failure response variable is evaluated.
We use the two contiguity matrices W F and W B defined, respectively, by equation (12)
and (13). The former is based on data on international interbank credit flows, assuming equal
interconnectedness of all banks within each country, while the latter is based on more detailed
information on interbank loans at the bank level, assuming perfectly proportional allocation of
credit across banks, within the constraints provided by the data on international flows. Table 4
provides the results for the models based on W B, as well as regular logistic regressions without
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spatial component, while Table 5 provides results for the models based on W F .
—Table 4 about here—
—Table 5 about here—
From the above tables, we first comment on our main object of interest, the estimation of the
intensity of autocorrelation in the interbank credit network. The estimates of ρ are relatively
similar, around 0.75, ranging from 0.70 to 0.85, with the exception of the models for 2008
onwards. This indicates a relatively high level of autocorrelation in defaults, despite the low
number of defaults in the data. Overall, the models for after the onset of the recent financial
crisis are less reasonable, which is likely to be due to the low number of bank failures (visible
in Table 6), presumably related to the higher level of government interventions in the banking
sector.
Although our main focus is on the contagious effect of bank defaults, it is worth checking
whether the signs of the coefficient for other variables are in expected directions, which helps
to validate our model specification. In many cases, the significant effects show the theoretically
expected signs associated with risk taking behaviour on the part of the banks. Bigger banks
tend to take more risks, which is visible in the negative sign for the size of the bank (expressed
as a logarithm of the total assets). Higher liquidity suggests that the liquidity is used for more
financial trading with higher risks, as it occurred during the financial crisis. High amounts of
deposits from banks would have a positive sign by the same logic, while the more conservative
and less risky strategy would lead to the negative sign we see for loans to other banks. The
positive sign on loan provisions is related to the attempt by the bank to deal with bad loans,
which is of course correlated with the risk of a bank failure. The sign for leverage is coun-
terintuitive: a higher leverage means more capital to cover unexpected losses (Arena, 2008).
The interpretation we have is that more capitalised banks might, again, demonstrate more ag-
gressive behaviour, thus increasing their risk levels. The sign for the coefficient on return on
assets is difficult to interpret, as this is a typical proxy for risky behaviour, and the effect on the
probability of failure should therefore be positive, theoretically.
We remark that the extended models (3, 6, 9, 11, 13, and 15) are designed to better cap-
ture the network interdependence by including a more comprehensive set of control variables.
However, high multicollinearity renders interpretation of the coefficients in these models less
reasonable. Similarly, the results in Table 5 are based on the assumption of uniform flows,
which may be too restrictive. Although we removed all variables which lead to high multi-
collinearity, in the extended model specifications the remaining multicollinearity can still lead
to coefficients with high standard errors, large magnitudes, and occasionally changes of signs.
The purpose of this article, however, is not to provide an accurate estimate of the risk drivers of
bank failures, but rather to introduce an approach for predicting bank defaults and for measur-
ing the risk of contagion. Our connectivity matrices W B and W F are approximations of the true
interbank credit matrices based on limited information and strong assumptions. An applied
researcher in, for example, a central bank will have more accurate information on interbank
lending and will be able to calibrate a more appropriate model specification.
Concerning the impact of macroeconomic variables, our results suggest that the logarithm
of the GDP growth is not significant, in either of the considered periods. This may be due to
its high correlation with the logarithm of the unemployment rate, which is instead negatively
significant in the second (post-crisis) period, for both W B and W F based models, suggesting
that, in good economic times (characterised by low unemployment rates) banks take more
risk and, therefore, are more likely to default. Last, the inflation rate negatively affects the
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probability of default, a result in line with what can be expected based on the literature.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a method, based on binary spatial regression models, to estimate the inter-
bank interdependence of bank failures due to credit ties, both national and international.
The method has been applied to the estimation of the contagion parameter for the banks in
the Eurozone, for the period between 1996 and 2012. We have found evidence of a relatively
high level of autocorrelation, despite the low number of defaults in the data.
The proposed model provides both a description of the contagion (through the spatial com-
ponent) and a predictive capability, differently from most existing contagion models, which
provide either of the two. The model can be easily implemented, as a modification of a clas-
sical logistic regression that includes interconnectedness. We believe the findings which can
be derived from the model may be useful, especially for supervisors and central bankers who
can use it in an early warning monitoring perspective, for measuring contagion risk and for a
stress testing analysis. Particularly, after estimating the proposed model, supervisory authori-
ties could intervene if the level of contagion risk, given by the autocorrelation parameter, is too
high, e.g. higher than 0.8. If central banks are interested in performing a stress testing anal-
ysis, they can use our proposal and compute the number of predicted banks’ failures. If this
percentage is too high, for example higher than 5%, the central authority could also intervene
to ensure the financial stability of the banking sector.
From an applied viewpoint, further research may involve a discussion of implications of
the above finding, partly by visualising the effects in terms of the spatial multiplier as proposed
by Franzese and Hays (2008), (I−ρW)−1, which can demonstrate the expected impact of a
particular bank failure on the overall banking sector. From a methodological viewpoint, further
research may involve employing a different generalised linear model, such as the generalised
extreme value regression models discussed in Calabrese and Giudici (2014) and Calabrese
and Elkink (2016). Finally, the dependence structure can be extended to the dynamic case
(Arakelian and Dellaportas, 2010).
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default 7.9 9.3
active 3.6 4.6
Table 1: Percentage of defaults among neighbours in the interbank credit network, by bank
status.
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Table 3: Number of defaults by bank size in total assets.
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